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Almost ten years after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, Osama Bin Laden, 
the man most identified with planning and executing those attacks was killed by U.S. 
forces and buried at sea.  The news of Bin Laden’s death was greeted in the U.S. by 
celebrations and a burst of patriotic feeling by many. 
The celebrations of Bin Laden’s death have been described by some as potentially 
contributing to greater anti-American sentiment, or even further acts of terrorism 
against.  While this is a possibility the U.S. It seems unlikely that Bin Laden’s death, or 
the American reaction to it, will inspire a rash of anti-American feeling.  Those who find 
American celebration of the death Bin Laden unseemly or who are driven into paroxysms 
of anti-American hatred because the U.S. succeeded in tracking down and killing a sworn 
enemy are probably already pretty far down the Jihadist road anyway. 
Americans are not unjustified in celebrating the death of the man behind attacks on their 
country that killed thousands, but these celebrations still seemed somewhat strange and 
almost nostalgic.  They were reminiscent of the days immediately following September 
11th when spontaneous bursts of patriotism were not unusual and when feelings about the 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. had not become intertwined with feelings about the war in 
Iraq or even about partisan politics.  It was as if Bin Laden’s death had somehow brought 
us all back in time. 
Bin Laden’s death brought out a strong emotional response from many Americans, but 
the impact of this event on U.S. security is less clear.  Although Bin Laden’s death may 
be an event of global significance which will change the course of the struggle against al 
Qaeda and Jihadist terror, by 2011 Bin Laden had become something of a marginal figure 
from the past.  He had spent the better part of the last decade hiding in a cave, proving 
himself something less than the fearless anti-American warrior he had once claimed to 
be.  His death is more notable because justice, or perhaps revenge, has finally been served, 
but its impact on American security is less clear. 
While the quest to find Bin Laden was ultimately successful, the cost for the U.S. in 
treasure, lives, political capital and goodwill has been enormous and cannot be 
recovered.  The more than nine year quest to capture Bin Laden, as part of a broader anti-
American strategy to be sure, has taken brought the U.S. into a number of complex 
foreign entanglements, at times taken attention away from more immediate priorities and 
been used to justify a range of policy choices, some of which have proven harmful to the 
U.S. or of, at best, peripheral relevance to the quest to capture or kill Bin Laden. 
There is something of a paradox in the way the war on terror was personalized by the U.S. 
government and presented as being largely about capturing or killing Bin Laden while at 
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the same time using the idea of combating terrorism to justify decisions, notably the war 
in Iraq, which had nothing to do with Osama Bin Laden.  This paradox continues after 
Bin Laden’s death.  The victory over Bin Laden reiterates that there is cost for attacking 
the US, and that those who do so will eventually be caught and have to pay for their 
actions.  At the same time Bin Laden’s death may complicate the struggle against Jihadist 
terror, but it certainly does not mean that struggle is over. 
With Bin Laden now dead al Qaeda has lost its leader and its ballast, but ironically, the 
US has lost a similar ballast.  Without the goal of capturing Bin Laden as the rationale for 
policies such as the war in Afghanistan, it will be much harder for the administration to 
justify these kinds of things to the American people.  To a lesser extent, without the threat 
represented by al Qaeda and Bin Laden as being at the center of global Jihad, the 
rationale behind much of the war on terror, which is at the core of US national security 
policy, will also be harder to defend.  The U.S. must now create policies which both 
reflect the reality of the threat as well as how the terror environment and U.S. goals have 
changed now that Bin Laden is dead. 
If the world were a qualitatively safer place without Bin Laden, there would be no 
conflict here, but victory against terror remains largely an abstraction, putting the US in 
the unenviable position of having to explain why the struggle against terror must continue 
despite having achieved the highest goal of the struggle. 
